Children's reasoning about the causal significance of the temporal order of events. by McCormack, Teresa & Hoerl, C.
Children's reasoning about the causal significance of the
temporal order of events.
McCormack, T., & Hoerl, C. (2005). Children's reasoning about the causal significance of the temporal order of
events. Developmental Psychology, 41(1)(1), 54-63. DOI: 10.1037/0012-1649.41.1.54
Published in:
Developmental Psychology
Document Version:
Early version, also known as pre-print
Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal:
Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated
with these rights.
Take down policy
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to
ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the
Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk.
Download date:15. Feb. 2017
Children’s Reasoning About the Causal Significance of the Temporal
Order of Events
Teresa McCormack
Queen’s University Belfast
Christoph Hoerl
University of Warwick
Four experiments examined children’s ability to reason about the causal significance of the order in
which 2 events occurred (the pressing of buttons on a mechanically operated box). In Study 1, 4-year-olds
were unable to make the relevant inferences, whereas 5-year-olds were successful on one version of the
task. In Study 2, 3-year-olds were successful on a simplified version of the task in which they were able
to observe the events although not their consequences. Study 3 found that older children had difficulties
with the original task even when provided with cues to attend to order information. However, 5-year-olds
performed successfully in Study 4, in which the causally relevant event was made more salient.
Much of the recent research on the development of causal
reasoning has emphasized young children’s competence with var-
ious aspects of causal reasoning (e.g., Corrigan & Denton, 1996;
Gopnik, Sobel, Schulz, & Glymour, 2001; Schlottmann, Allen,
Linderoth, & Hesketh, 2002). It has been well established that even
in infancy children show some type of sensitivity to the causal
relationships between events (Leslie, 1982; Oakes, 1994; Oakes &
Cohen, 1990) and that children in the preschool years show an
appreciation of the causal powers of familiar objects (Bullock,
Gelman, & Baillargeon, 1982; Gelman, Bullock, & Meck, 1980)
and seem to infer the causal powers of novel objects in principled
ways (Shultz, 1982; Shultz & Kestenbaum, 1985). Indeed, the idea
that relatively sophisticated causal reasoning abilities are intact
early in development has played an important role in the influential
“theory–theory” approach to conceptual development.
This emphasis on the competence of preschoolers’ causal rea-
soning can be contrasted with a claim by Povinelli, Landry, Theall,
Clark, and Castille (1999) that 3-year-olds have difficulty with a
fundamental causal ability, a causal ability that Povinelli et al.
have linked closely with the development of a concept of time.
Specifically, they have argued that children of this age may not
grasp that events that occurred in the more recent past may be
more relevant to determining the current state of the world than
events that took place at an earlier point in time. To use a common
example, imagine that you have lost your car keys and are trying
to find them. You may mentally retrace the day’s events in an
attempt to remember what you were doing when you last had the
car keys, because you know that this most recent event is the most
causally relevant to the current location of the keys. Povinelli et
al.’s claim is that 3-year-olds do not have this kind of understand-
ing of the causal relevance of the relative recency of events.
They examined this ability in 3- and 5-year-olds (Povinelli et al.,
1999, Study 5) using a delayed video feedback technique. Along
with an experimenter, children took part in two different games,
one after another, in a room in which there were two different
colored boxes attached to the wall behind the location where the
child was seated. During Game 1, and unbeknownst to the child, a
second experimenter placed a puppet in, for example, the blue box;
during Game 2, the puppet was moved, again unbeknownst to the
child, to, for example, the red box. After the children had played
both games, they were shown videotapes of themselves playing the
games and were able to see that the second experimenter had
placed the puppet first in one box and then in the other box located
behind them. After viewing the two videotapes, children were
asked to identify the current location of the puppet.
The crucial manipulation in Povinelli et al.’s (1999) study was
that children were not necessarily shown the videotapes of the
games in the order in which the games had actually taken place.
Half of the children were shown the tape of Game 1 before that of
Game 2, but the other half saw the tape of Game 2 before they
were shown that of Game 1. Povinelli et al. wanted to examine
whether children grasped that it was the more recent of the two
events (i.e., the placing of the puppet in the red box during Game
2) that was crucial in working out where the toy was currently
located. They found that 3-year-olds were unable accurately to
identify the current location of the toy and that even a 5-year-old
group was not significantly above chance at choosing the correct
box. In a subsequent study (Study 6), the order in which the games
were played was emphasized while the children were shown the
videotapes. In that study, 5-year-olds were successful but 3-year-
olds still performed at chance.
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Povinelli et al. (1999) described young children’s difficulties
with this task in terms of a failure to understand that the recent past
is causally bound to the present. Perhaps a more general way to
describe the nature of the difficulty is in terms of the idea that
children fail to grasp the causal significance of the temporal order
in which past events took place in working out the current state of
the world. In what follows, we distinguish between two quite
different ways in which children may be sensitive to temporal–
causal relationships. We label the first type of sensitivity temporal
updating. This is an important but relatively primitive ability that
is insufficient to perform well on the Povinelli et al. task. The
second type of sensitivity is more sophisticated, and we label it the
ability to make temporal–causal inferences.
Temporal updating simply involves altering one’s model of the
world as a series of causally related events unfolds (McCormack,
2001). Even very young children are clearly capable of changing
their model of the world as they observe or infer it being modified
(demonstrated, for example, in successful performance on the
Piagetian A-not-B and invisible displacement tasks). Further, pre-
school children can find out about a series of events subsequent to
their occurrence (e.g., by being told about them) and update their
model of the world accordingly. For example, imagine two events,
E1 and E2, that are causally related such that the subsequent state
of the world is affected by the order in which E1 and E2 occur.
That is, one outcome obtains if E1 comes first followed by E2, and
a different outcome obtains if E2 is followed by E1. (In the case of
Povinelli et al.’s task, E1 could be the placing of the puppet in the
blue box and E2 the placing of the puppet in the red box.)
Providing the child finds out about the events in the order in which
they occur or have occurred, they could update their model of the
world first in response to E1, then in response to E2, and thus
would come to an accurate conclusion about the overall outcome.
That is, they need only update their model of the world sequen-
tially as they find out about each event.
Although simple updating will be sufficient in some circum-
stances, it will be insufficient, for example, in circumstances when
the order in which children find out about events in the series
differs from the order in which the events actually occurred. This
is the case in Povinelli et al.’s (1999) study, in which the use of
videotapes allowed the experimenters to manipulate the order in
which children found out about the two hiding events, such that it
was not necessarily identical to the order in which the events
occurred. Thus, some children found out about E2 before finding
out about E1. If children are merely updating their model of the
world sequentially as they find out about each event in the series,
their model of the world might erroneously correspond to the
circumstances in E2 rather than E1. When the order in which
children find out about events differs from the order in which the
events actually occurred, and indeed in many other circumstances,
updating is insufficient, and instead a temporal–causal inference
is required. Children must consider the order in which two or more
events have occurred and use information about that order to make
an inference about a current state of the world. In the case of
Povinelli et al.’s task, for instance, children’s making the required
temporal–causal inference involves them being able to distinguish
the order in which E1 and E2 (the hiding events) actually occurred
from the order in which they found out about those events and
using their knowledge about the former in working out the current
location of the puppet.
For present purposes, we define a temporal–causal inference
broadly as one in which the causal implications of the temporal
order of two or more events must be considered in one’s reasoning.
There are two obvious circumstances in which temporal–causal
reasoning comes into play. A temporal–causal inference could
involve taking into account the order of previous events in making
a judgment about a current state of the world. This is the type of
temporal–causal inference required in Povinelli et al.’s (1999)
task. Alternatively, a temporal–causal inference could involve the
reverse type of reasoning: using information about a current state
of the world to make a retrospective inference about the order in
which a series of events must have occurred. In both cases, making
the correct inference requires making use of the fact that the causal
outcome of the events in the series depends on the order in which
the events took place.
Although the distinction between simple updating and
temporal–causal inference is a fundamental one, there is little
available evidence that would enable us accurately to identify the
point in development at which children are capable of making
temporal–causal inferences. Indeed, Povinelli’s et al.’s (1999)
study is the only one that we are aware of that explicitly addresses
this issue. The aims of the present studies were thus twofold. First,
we wished to examine whether young children were capable of
making both types of temporal–causal inferences described above.
Can they take into account the order in which two past events
occurred to infer a current state of the world, or, conversely, if
informed about a current state of the world, can they infer the order
in which two past events must have occurred? Two versions of a
new task were constructed, one to examine each of these two
aspects of temporal–causal reasoning. The second aim was to
provide empirical substance to the distinction between temporal
updating and temporal–causal reasoning. To fulfill this latter aim,
it was necessary to contrast one of the temporal–causal reasoning
tasks with a similar task that could be passed by simple updating
alone. Thus, across the studies described here, there were three
versions of our task in total: two temporal–causal reasoning tasks
and a third that could be solved by temporal updating alone.
One way of measuring temporal–causal reasoning is to conduct
two (or more) events that the child does not observe and is not
aware of, and then to inform the child about the occurrence of
those events in an order that differs from the order in which the
events actually took place. This is the method used by Povinelli et
al. (1999). A potential disadvantage of this method is that it
requires using a representational medium, such as videotape, that
allows the experimenter to vary the order in which children are
made aware of the relevant past events. Another way is to conduct
two events that the child is aware are occurring, but to conduct
those events out of sight of the child so that the child cannot
observe the order in which they occur. The child is then subse-
quently provided with information that would allow him or her
retrospectively to work out the order in which the events occurred.
This is the method used in our temporal–causal reasoning tasks,
which had the following structure. First, children were introduced
to two doll characters, Sally and Katy, who always performed
tasks in a certain order: They learned that Sally always went first,
and then Katy always went next. Children were then shown a novel
piece of apparatus—a large yellow box with two differently col-
ored buttons—and learned how it worked (see Figure 1). Pressing
one of the buttons caused a toy car to appear on a shelf in a
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transparent window, whereas pressing the other button caused a
marble to appear on the shelf in the window. The window only
ever contained one toy at a time, as the box was mechanically
constructed such that whatever toy was already in the window
dropped out of sight before a new toy appeared (the shelf that held
the object rotated automatically whenever a button was pressed to
release a new object, taking the old object out of sight). A screen
was then put in front of the box and, out of view of the child, Sally
and Katy pressed one button each. Finally, the box was uncovered
again.
In Study 1, there were two versions of the task testing the two
types of temporal–causal inference described above. In the infer-
object version, after the screen was removed, children could see
each doll standing next to the button that she had pressed but the
window in the box was left occluded. In this version of the task,
children had to infer which toy was inside the window. In other
words, given information from which they could determine the
order in which two earlier events had occurred (the pressing of the
buttons), children had to infer the current state of the world (the
object in the window). There was also an infer-agent condition. In
this version of the task, children were told that Sally and Katy had
pressed one button each, but the dolls did not stand next to the
buttons they had pressed when the screen was removed. Instead,
children were shown the contents of the window and were asked to
place each doll beside the button that she had pressed. That is,
given information about the current state of the world, children had
to infer the order in which two earlier events had occurred. Both of
these tasks require making a temporal–causal inference as we have
defined it, insofar as correct performance depends on considering
the causal implications of the temporal order of the two button-
pressing events.
To examine the distinction between temporal updating and
temporal–causal reasoning, we used a third version of the task
(Study 2). The visible version of the task was identical to the
infer-object task, except for one important procedural change
during the testing phase. During this phase, children were actually
shown the dolls sequentially pressing their buttons rather than the
buttons being pressed behind a screen. Children were still unable
to see what was actually in the window following each button
press, and after the two buttons had been pressed they were
required to judge the contents of the window. Allowing the chil-
dren to see each button press as it occurred should enable children
to sequentially update their model of the contents of the window,
thus we would predict that even quite young children should pass
this version of the task.
The infer-object and infer-agent tasks are in some ways similar
to the task used by Povinelli et al. (1999), in that two events occur
out of sight and children subsequently do not find out about these
events in the order in which those events have occurred. Thus,
simple updating is insufficient to pass these tasks. Children do not
see the button-pressing events as they happen; rather, they must
use the information they are subsequently provided with to either
infer a current state of the world (infer-object task) or to figure out
the order in which the events happened (infer-agent task). How-
ever, although our infer-object task has a similar requirement to
that of Povinelli et al., in that it requires using order information to
infer a current state of the world, it obviously differs in many other
ways. One important difference, mentioned earlier, is that the task
does not involve using videotaped events. Although Povinelli et al.
argued convincingly that young children’s difficulties in their
study do not stem from the use of videotapes, it is important to
establish whether young children have global problems with
temporal–causal reasoning that extend to circumstances that do
not involve representational media such as videotapes or
photographs.
If we are correct that our temporal–causal reasoning tasks tap a
similar ability to Povinelli et al.’s (1999) task, we can make
predictions about performance based on their findings. We should
expect children who are age 5 to be capable of passing these tasks,
whereas children below this age should have difficulties. In fact,
Povinelli et al.’s studies found that 5-year-olds were only signif-
icantly above chance when the experimenter specifically empha-
sized the order in which the two causally relevant events occurred.
Therefore, we might expect 5-year-olds to need similar cues. With
regard to the visible version of the task, which we argue only
assesses temporal updating abilities, we would predict that chil-
dren younger than 5 should find this task straightforward.
Study 1
In this study, children were given either the infer-object or the
infer-agent task. It was not clear in advance of the study whether
one of these tasks would prove to be easier than the other. On the
one hand, it might be possible to argue that the infer-agent con-
dition should be harder, insofar as working out the order of the
button-pressing events might involve in some sense “mentally
undoing” the current outcome (e.g., reasoning that although there
is a car in the window now, first there was a marble [so Sally
should go by the red button] and only after that did the car appear
[so Katy should go by the blue button]). Thus, it might be possible
to argue that the infer-agent condition requires a certain degree of
reversibility of thought, in the Piagetian sense. Arguably, the
infer-object condition does not require such mental undoing of a
current outcome, and children could potentially pass the infer-
object condition by reasoning through the sequence of events that
happened in the order that they happened (e.g., Sally pressed the
red button, giving a car, then Katy pressed the blue button, giving
a marble, therefore there is marble in the window now). On the
other hand, it might be argued that the infer-agent condition should
be easier, because by its very nature it requires children to focus on
the dolls and on the order in which they pressed the buttons. In the
infer-object condition, the task cannot be passed unless children
Figure 1. Schematic drawing of the apparatus.
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focus on the crucial information provided about the order in which
the buttons were pressed, which is given by the location of each
doll. Potentially, children might ignore the dolls and their locations
and try to guess the contents of the window without grasping that
the information is available to them to infer the correct answer. In
the infer-agent condition, children are handed the dolls and re-
quired to put them in the correct locations, ensuring that they focus
on the dolls and their locations. On this analysis, the infer-agent
condition might be predicted to be easier.
Method
Participants
Forty-five four-year-olds (mean age  56 months, range  51–59
months) and 49 five-year-olds (mean age  65 months, range  60–71
months) took part in the study. There were 54 boys and 40 girls. Three
additional children were tested who were subsequently excluded from the
sample, 1 child because he had a formal diagnosis of autism and 2 children
because they proved too distractible for the testing protocol to be followed
correctly. Twenty-two four-year olds and 26 five-year-olds took part in the
infer-object condition, and 23 four-year-olds and 23 five-year-olds took
part in the infer-agent condition. Children were recruited from primary
schools and nursery schools local to our universities. Eighty-four of the
children were of Caucasian descent, 4 were of Afro-Caribbean descent, and
7 were of Asian descent. Children were primarily from working- and
middle-class backgrounds. They were tested individually in a quiet corner
of their schools, and each child received a set of stickers of his or her
choice for taking part.
Materials
Two clothed wooden dolls were used that differed in the color of their
clothes and of their hair. Sally was 11 cm high, and Katy was 8.5 cm high.
Three different sets of toy props were used in the training phase of the
study. There was a plastic shop counter, on which there were two miniature
toys of appropriate size for the dolls; one was a toy motorcycle and the
other a toy train. On a second shop counter, there were two stickers, one
depicting a flower and the other depicting a smiling face. There were also
two toy dogs, one white and one black, which were placed next to a set of
miniature plastic plants.
A large, electrically powered yellow box apparatus was used in the test
phase of the experiment (see Figure 1). The box was approximately 50 cm
high, 44 cm wide, and 26 cm deep. On one side of the box there was a red
button and on the other side there was a blue button, with each button
located 11 cm from the base. In the middle of the front of the box there was
a window 8 cm  8.5 cm that was covered by a hinged transparent plastic
window. Inside the box (out of sight of the participants) were two rotating
hoppers that could store up to five objects in separate chambers. Each
hopper was operated by one of the buttons on the side of the box. When a
button was pressed, the hopper rotated so that one of the chambers moved
above the entrance of a chute, and any object in the chamber would then
drop down the chute into view on a platform located behind the transparent
window in the front of the box. The platform onto which objects fell was
linked to the rotating mechanism of the hoppers, such that when a button
was pressed, both the platform and the hopper rotated in synchrony. When
the platform rotated, any object that was already sitting on it fell away into
a drawer at the bottom of the box, to be replaced by the new object from
the hopper. Thus, there was only ever a single object in the window at any
one time, with each old object being replaced by a new one when a button
was pressed. When the hoppers and platform were rotating, a mechanical
noise could be heard that was identical for each button and could not be
localized to one or other side of the box. The objects dispensed by the box
were small marbles of different sizes and colors, and miniature toy cars of
various types and colors.
Procedure
Training phase (i). Children were introduced to Sally and Katy and
were told that Sally was older than Katy. They then watched Sally and Katy
engage in three activities with different sets of props. In the first activity,
Sally and Katy visited the toy shop, where there were two toys on the shelf.
Children were told that Sally and Katy would get one toy each and that
Sally would go first because “Sally always goes first.” Sally removed one
of the toys, and then the children were told to watch as Katy went next and
removed the other toy, because “Katy always goes next, after Sally.” The
other two activities were identical in structure and accompanied by the
same wording; in the second activity the dolls chose a dog each to play
with, and in the third activity the dolls chose one of two stickers each. After
the children viewed the dolls engaged in all three activities, the dolls were
set aside and the children were told that they would return to them later.
Training phase (ii). In this phase, children were introduced to how the
yellow box worked. The experimenter pointed out the two colored buttons
on either side of the box and urged the child to watch what happened when
one of the buttons was pressed. The experimenter then pressed either the
red or the blue button, and then either a toy car or a marble appeared in the
window. Which button was pressed and which button yielded which toy
were counterbalanced. The experimenter removed the object, showed it to
the child, and asked the child what it was. This was to obtain the child’s
preferred name for the marble, because it had been established in pilot
testing that not all children were familiar with the word marble. The
majority of children spontaneously referred to the marble as a little ball; all
children used the word car to describe the toy car. The experimenter
replaced the object in the window and then pressed the same button again.
The child watched as the object disappeared to be replaced by another
object of a different color but of the same type. The experimenter provided
a verbal description of what was happening, for example, “Look, that car
goes away. And now look, we get a different car.” The children were then
encouraged to guess what would appear in the window if the experimenter
pressed the same button again, with the experimenter providing the sug-
gestion if the child did not spontaneously name the object type. The
experimenter then pressed the same button a third time, and after the new
object appeared in the window it was removed and set aside. The experi-
menter then repeated the same procedure with the other colored button.
The first pair of pretest questions was then asked. Children were asked,
“If I press this red [blue] button, what will we get here in the window?” The
order in which each button was asked about was approximately counter-
balanced between children (43 children were asked about the red button
first, and 51 were asked about the blue button first). If the child got either
one of the pretest questions incorrect, the experimenter repeated the train-
ing procedure involving the box, pressing each of the buttons three times
again. If the child again failed either one of the pretest questions, the
procedure was halted and the child was not included in the testing.
Following the first pair of pretest questions, the dolls were reintroduced to
the child, and the child was told that the dolls were going to play with the
yellow box and that they were going to press one button each. Children
were then asked, “You remember Sally and Katy! Let’s think about them.
Which one of them always goes first?” Children were allowed to either
name one of the dolls or point to one of them; none of the children got this
question wrong. They were then asked the second pair of pretest questions.
Their attention was drawn to the two buttons on the yellow box, and the
experimenter said, “If we wanted to get a toy car [marble (little ball)],
which button would we press?” Once the child had answered, the question
was repeated for the other object. The order in which the children were
asked about each object was approximately counterbalanced (53 children
were asked about the car first, and 39 children were asked about the marble
first). If the children got either of these questions incorrect, the training
phase involving the box was repeated from the start. If the children again
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got one of the second pair of pretest questions wrong following this extra
training, the procedure was terminated and the children were not tested.
Test phase. Children were told that Sally and Katy were going to play
with the box, and were going to press one of the buttons each, but that they
would not be able to see Sally and Katy pressing their buttons. In the
infer-object condition, the window of the box was first covered with a
small square of card that slotted just behind the transparent cover. The
entire front of the box apparatus was then covered with a folding purple
cardboard screen. The two dolls were taken behind the screen, and the
experimenter pressed first one button and then the other button. Children
could hear the (identical) mechanical noises that resulted from each button
being pressed but could not see the buttons being pressed. The experi-
menter placed each one of the dolls beside one of the buttons, with the
location of the dolls counterbalanced across children. The large screen was
then removed from in front of the apparatus, and the child could see the
dolls each standing beside one button but could not see what was inside the
window as it remained covered with the card. Children were reminded that
the dolls had pressed one button each and that the dolls were standing
beside the buttons that they had pressed. The experimenter then said, “OK,
now you know which button each doll pressed. What do you think is inside
the window?”
In the infer-agent condition, the procedure was similar except that the
window was never covered with a piece of card. As in the infer-object
condition, the experimenter pressed first one button, and then the other,
while the apparatus was covered with the large purple screen. When the
large screen was removed, the experimenter said, “Now, you can see what
is inside the window. Yes, it’s a car [marble]” (counterbalanced between
children). The experimenter handed the child the two dolls and said, “OK,
I want you to work out which of the dolls pressed which button. I want you
to put each doll beside the button that you think she pressed.”
Results and Discussion
Two of the 4-year-olds who took part in the infer-object task
failed the pretesting questions twice and thus were not tested. Ten
of the 4-year-olds and 7 of the 5-year-olds required repetition of
the second training phase. Table 1 shows the percentages of
children in each group who answered the test question correctly.
The 4-year-old group did not perform at a level exceeding chance
on either the infer-object task (binomial test, p  .82) or the
infer-agent task (binomial test, p .41). The 5-year-olds did better
on both tasks, with the majority of 5-year-olds passing the infer-
object task and the infer-agent task. However, the 5-year-old group
did not perform at a level significantly above chance on the
infer-object task (binomial test, p  .33) and did not significantly
outperform the 4-year-old group on this task. On the infer-agent
task, the 5-year-olds were performing at a level significantly above
chance (binomial test, p  .05) and performed significantly better
than the 4-year-olds (Fisher’s exact test, two-tailed, p  .05).
In summary, 4-year-olds did not pass either the infer-object or
the infer-agent task, and 5-year-olds’ performance was signifi-
cantly above chance only on the infer-agent task. Our findings are
thus broadly consistent with those of Povinelli et al. (1999, Study
5), despite the differences between our task and the one used by
Povinelli et al. They also found that a group of children younger
than 5 had difficulties making an inference about a current state of
the world by exploiting information about the order in which two
events had happened. They found that even a 5-year-old group had
some difficulties with this task, although they found that 5-year-
olds did better if the order of the past events was emphasized at
testing (Povinelli et al., 1999, Study 6). The finding that the
5-year-old group was significantly better than the 4-year-olds and
significantly above chance on the infer-agent task suggests that
children of this age do have some grasp of the causal relevance of
the temporal order of events. However, we need to consider why
this group performed above chance on the infer-agent task but not
on the infer-object task.
On our analysis, passing infer-object task requires (a) attending
to the locations of the dolls, (b) retrieving the information acquired
during training about the order in which the dolls act, (c) retrieving
the information acquired during training about which button gives
which object, and (d) putting together these two pieces of infor-
mation. Children’s difficulties could potentially result from any
one of these four components of the task. Arguably, components
(a)–(c) are somewhat easier in the infer-agent condition than in the
infer-object task. First, the test question in the infer-agent condi-
tion immediately requires children to focus on the dolls them-
selves. Second, the nature of the question and the focusing of the
child’s attention in this way may also act as a strong cue for
retrieving the information acquired in training about the order in
which the dolls always act. More tentatively, a third possibility is
that actually being able to see one of the two toys in the window
that they encountered in training acts as a good retrieval cue for the
information acquired in training about the object yielded by each
button. In Studies 3 and 4 we altered the test question in the
infer-object task in an attempt to make components (a) and (b) of
the task easier, by getting the children to focus on the dolls and the
order in which they always do things.
Study 2
The results of Study 1 indicate that 4-year-olds have difficulty
making temporal–causal inferences in which they are required to
reason about the order in which two events occurred, and that even
5-year-olds may still have some difficulty making such inferences.
We have contrasted this type of reasoning with simple updating, in
which children need only update or change their model of the
world as a series of two events or more unfolds. We have sug-
gested that very young children are capable of updating, providing
they can keep track of the events as they occur or are told about the
events in the order in which they happened. If this is correct, then
even children of 4 years and perhaps younger should be able to
pass a version of the infer-object task in which they do not need to
retrospectively consider the order in which the dolls pressed the
buttons but rather view each button-pressing event as it occurs. To
examine this prediction, we tested 3-year-olds on the visible ver-
sion of the infer-object task, in which the large purple screen was
not placed in front of the box apparatus as the dolls pressed the
buttons. All other aspects of the task stayed the same.
Table 1
Percentage of Children in Each Age Group Who Answered the
Test Question Correctly in Studies 1, 3, and 4
Study and condition 4-year-olds 5-year-olds
Study 1, infer agent 39 74
Study 1, infer object 55 62
Study 3, infer object 55 56
Study 4, infer object 31 71
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In addition to examining whether 3-year-olds are capable of
accurate updating on this task, this modification also potentially
allows us to examine whether older children’s problems stem from
difficulties understanding how the apparatus works or remember-
ing which button gives which object. The modified version of the
task places many of the same requirements on the child as the
original version, except it does not require a retrospective
temporal–causal inference to be made. Thus, if 3-year-olds per-
form successfully on the modified task, it would suggest that older
children’s difficulties lie with making the appropriate temporal–
causal inference.
Method
Participants
Participants were 22 three-year-olds (mean age 44 months, range 
39–50 months; 13 boys and 9 girls). Twenty of the children were of
Caucasian descent, and 2 were of Afro-Caribbean descent. Children were
drawn from a nursery for the children of staff and students at Queen’s
University and were tested individually in a quiet room in the nursery.
Children received a set of stickers of their choice for participating in the
task.
Materials
These were identical to those used in Study 1.
Procedure
The training procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1. The testing
phase of the experiment was also identical to the infer-object condition of
Experiment 1, except that the large purple screen was not placed in front
of the apparatus while the dolls pressed their buttons. Instead, only the
transparent window was covered, and children watched as first Sally and
then Katy pressed one of the buttons. Children were asked to infer which
object was in the window after they had seen both buttons being pressed.
Results and Discussion
Four children who failed to complete training were excluded
from the test phase; none of the remaining children required
repetition of any of the training phases. Of the remaining 18
children, 15 correctly judged which object was behind the window.
Thus, children were significantly above chance (binomial test, p
.01) on the visible version of the infer-object task. These results
contrast with the findings of Experiment 1, in which even 5-year-
olds had difficulty with the infer-object task. As we have empha-
sized, the only difference between the two versions of the task is
whether children could actually see the two buttons pressed one at
a time by the doll characters, as opposed to finding out shortly
afterward which doll pressed which button. Our findings provide
support for our distinction between updating and making genuine
temporal–causal inferences, with 3-year-olds being competent at
the former.
Study 3
The good performance of 3-year-olds on the visible version of
the infer-object task is in contrast to older children’s at-chance
performance on the original version of the task and again raises the
question of what exactly children find so difficult about this task.
We have suggested that perhaps children may simply guess what
object is inside the window, rather than using the crucial informa-
tion provided by the position of the two dolls about the order in
which the buttons have been pressed. This may be because chil-
dren either fail to attend to the locations of the dolls or fail to
retrieve or utilize their knowledge acquired at training. Perhaps
young children are capable of utilizing such information if their
attention is explicitly drawn to it and they are encouraged to think
about it. This possibility was examined in Study 3, in which
children were given a cue to attend to the dolls and to think about
the order in which the dolls act before answering the test question.
Method
Participants
Thirty-one four-year-olds (mean age  56 months, range  48–59
months) and 32 five-year-olds (mean age  65 months, range  60–71
months) from primary schools and nursery schools local to our universities
took part in the study. There were 41 boys and 22 girls. One additional
4-year-old girl who was tested was not included in the sample because she
would not supply an answer to the test question. All of the children were
of Caucasian descent, and they were primarily of middle-class background.
None of the children had previously taken part in Study 1. Children were
tested individually in a quiet room in their schools and received a set of
stickers for their participation.
Materials
These were identical to those used in Studies 1 and 2.
Procedure
The training and test procedures were identical to those used in the
infer-object condition in Study 1, except for a single modification. At the
test phase, the large purple screen was removed and the experimenter said:
OK, I want you to think carefully. Which doll went first? That’s right
[children never answered this question incorrectly]. So Sally went first
and pressed her button and then Katy went next and pressed her
button. Look at the buttons Sally and Katy pressed. There is one thing
inside the window now. What do you think is inside the window right
now?
Thus, children’s attention was explicitly drawn to the dolls and to the order
in which the buttons were pressed.
Results and Discussion
None of the children failed to complete training. The second
phase of training had to be repeated for 6 of the 4-year-olds. Table
1 shows the percentage of children of each age group who an-
swered the test question correctly in this modified version of the
infer-object task. It can be seen that these percentages are very
similar to those in Study 1, despite the modification of the test
instructions. Again, a marginal majority of 5-year-olds did answer
correctly, but as a group they were not above chance (binomial
test, p  .60), and the 4-year-old group was also not above chance
on this task (binomial test, p  .72). The difference between the
two groups was also not significant (Fisher’s exact test, p  .05).
Thus, despite drawing children’s attention to the dolls and to the
order in which the button-pressing events occurred, performance
was still not very good on this task. Performance on this task can
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be contrasted with the excellent performance of 3-year-olds in
Study 2, in which the actual button-pressing events could be
observed. In the present task, although the button-pressing was
hidden from view, children’s attention was drawn by the experi-
menter to the dolls and to the order in which the buttons had been
pressed, with the experimenter restating what had happened out of
view. Povinelli et al. (1999) have argued that children below age
5 do not grasp the significance of order information in coming to
a conclusion about the current state of the world. This may be true
for our younger children too; however, given Povinelli et al.’s
(1999, Study 6) findings, and the findings of the infer-agent task in
Study 1, it is difficult to conclude that 5-year-olds’ problems with
the infer-object task stem from a lack of this basic type of
understanding.
One possible reason for the poor performance of the 5-year-olds
may be that the task protocol makes one of the doll characters—
Sally, who goes first—more salient than the other. When children
were questioned about order (which occurred twice in the protocol
for Study 3), they were asked, “Which doll goes first?” Making
Sally more salient in this way may lead to difficulties at test, in that
although she pressed a button first, it is the button that Katy
pressed that determines which object is in the window when
children are asked the test question. The task procedure was altered
in Study 4 to try to balance the salience of the two doll characters.
Study 4
Method
Participants
Twenty-six four-year-olds (mean age  56 months, range  52–59
months) and 35 five-year-olds (mean age  65 months, range  60–69
months) took part in the study, from primary schools and nursery schools
local to our universities. There were 37 boys and 24 girls. None of the
children had participated in any of the other studies. Two additional
5-year-olds were tested but were not included in the sample because the
task protocol was not followed correctly (both children removed the screen
from the window before answering the test question). All of the children
were of Caucasian descent, and they were primarily of lower- to middle-
class background. Children were tested individually in a quiet room in their
schools and received a set of stickers for their participation.
Materials
These were identical to those used in the previous studies.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that used in Study 3, except for three
alterations in the training phase and test instructions. First, during the first
phase of training, what was explicitly emphasized was not which doll went
first, but which doll went last (“Remember, Katy always goes last”).
Second, in the pretest questions, participants were asked, “Which doll
always goes last?” rather than which doll went first. Third, after the purple
screen was removed at testing, participants were asked, “So which doll
pressed her button last?” and after they had answered this question, the
experimenter said, “OK, so Sally pressed her button and then Katy pressed
her button. Look at the buttons that the dolls pressed. There is one thing
inside the window right now. What do you think it is?”
Results and Discussion
None of the children failed to complete training. Sections of the
training phases were repeated for 5 of the 4-year-olds and 1 of the
5-year-olds. Table 1 shows the percentage of children of each age
group who gave the correct answer to the test question. The
4-year-olds performed poorly on this task, with their performance
not differing significantly from chance (binomial test, p  .05).
However, the performance of the 5-year-olds was significantly
above chance (binomial test, p  .02). Their performance was
significantly better than that of the 4-year-olds (Fisher’s exact test,
p  .01).
The alteration of the task procedure to change the salience of the
doll that always goes first would seem to have been successful in
improving 5-year-olds’ performance on the task. The findings
suggest that the failure of the 5-year-olds in the infer-agent task in
Studies 1 and 3 was not due to a failure to grasp the significance
of temporal order per se but to focus on the correct piece of
causally significant information. There are in fact two, related,
possible descriptions of 5-year-olds’ difficulty in Study 3. Perhaps,
as suggested, in the previous studies children found Sally more
salient and based their answer simply on what Sally had done,
rather than shifting attention to what Katy, the doll who went last,
had done. A second, related, possibility is that the use of the word
first in itself is problematic for children of this age (see also Piaget,
1969). Although, in this context, first is clearly intended to be of
purely temporal significance, it is possible that the children had a
wider reading of the term than this, interpreting it as meaning the
most important doll—the one who has priority or who gets what
she wants. Given that Sally was also the larger doll, and introduced
as older than Katy, it seems possible that even the 5-year-olds
interpreted first in this way. It may be that simply removing the
term first from the task narrative helped improve the performance
of this group.
General Discussion
The aim of these studies was to establish a new task to examine
whether young children can reason about the causal significance of
the temporal order in which past events have occurred, as opposed
to simply being able to update their model of the world as changes
unfold. One important difference between the present paradigm
and that used by Povinelli et al. (1999) is that our task does not
require use of a representational medium such as videotape that
young children may have difficulty with. Despite using a very
different paradigm, our results closely resemble those of Povinelli
et al. (1999). Children below age 5 had difficulties making
temporal–causal inferences, even under circumstances in which
they were cued to attend to the relevant temporal order information
(Studies 1, 3, and 4). Five-year-olds were capable of making
temporal–causal inferences under some circumstances. In Study 1,
they passed the infer-agent version of the task, which involved
inferring the order in which two events must have happened, given
a current state of the world. In Study 4, they also passed an
infer-object version of the task, in which they were cued to use
temporal order information to infer a current state of the world.
Three-year-olds were successful on a visible version of the
infer-object task. This task was identical to the task used with older
children in the other studies apart from the fact that, in the visible
version, the children were actually able to see the dolls pressing
their buttons (rather than being shown the dolls standing beside the
buttons that they had just pressed, as in the normal version of the
task). Although this alteration of the task procedure may seem on
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first consideration to be slight, we would argue that it is important
because it enabled children to use updating to pass the task rather
than making a temporal–causal inference. Successful performance
simply required changing one’s model of the world (i.e., of the
contents of the window) sequentially as each button was pressed,
rather than having to recruit information about the temporal order
in which the buttons were pressed to retrospectively infer a state of
the world. The successful performance of the 3-year-old group on
the visible version of the task provides support for making a
developmental distinction between updating and temporal–causal
inference. Although intuitively plausible, there is little previous
empirical evidence that we are aware of that provides a basis for
this specific distinction.
Our findings provide further evidence that by at least 5 years,
children are capable of making temporal–causal inferences. How-
ever, even 5-year-olds seemed to have difficulty in some task
conditions. In the infer-object task in Study 1, children had to
spontaneously recruit order information that was implicit in the
display in making their inference about a current state of the world.
Five-year-olds were not above chance on this task, consistent with
the findings of Povinelli et al. (1999), who also found that a
5-year-old group was not significantly above chance on a version
of their task in which children were not cued to use temporal order
information. They found, however, that this age group performed
above chance when encouraged to think about the order in which
the previous events had occurred. Given Povinelli et al.’s findings,
we hypothesized that 5-year-olds’ performance might improve if
encouraged to attend to and use the information provided in the
display in the infer-object task that would allow them to make the
correct inference. This hypothesis is also suggested by the fact that
this age group was above chance in the infer-agent task. We have
suggested earlier that the questioning in the infer-agent task by its
nature requires children to attend to the dolls and to think about
information acquired in training about the order in which the dolls
always act. It is possible that in the infer-object task, children fail
to attend to the information provided to them in the display and
simply guess the answer. Therefore, we predicted that 5-year-olds
should perform above chance on this task if the relevant informa-
tion on which to base their reasoning is made explicit to them.
However, contrary to this prediction, providing this sort of cue
did not help even this older group (Study 3). The findings of Study
4, in which 5-year-olds did perform successfully, suggest that the
difficulties of this age group on the infer-object task in Studies 1
and 3 may have stemmed from the exact nature of the task
instructions and temporal cue that they were provided with. The
instructions used in Studies 1 and 3 made the doll that “always
goes first” the most salient doll and may have led to an underes-
timation of 5-year-olds’ abilities, because it is the actions of the
doll that went last that were in fact crucial in determining the
answer to the task question. In Study 4, in which children were
encouraged to attend to the doll that always went last, 5-year-olds
performed above chance.
In fact, this latter finding raises the possibility of an alternative
analysis of the demands of the task. We have suggested that the
infer-object task is a temporal–causal reasoning task insofar as it
involves reasoning about the causal consequences of the order in
which the two button-pressing events took place. However, it is
possible to argue that the infer-object task, as it stands, could be
passed simply by attending to one of the dolls, the doll that went
last, without considering both button-pressing events and the order
in which they occurred.1 This interpretation is made possible
because of the nature of the causal relationships used in the studies.
Specifically, the outcome of pressing each button is unaffected by
the sequence of events that precede it: In any given testing session,
the act of pressing a red button, for example, always yields a car,
regardless of what buttons have been pressed before it. An alter-
native scenario would have been to construct the apparatus such
that preceding events did have causal consequences for the out-
come of subsequent events: for example, designing the apparatus
such that pressing the red button only yielded a car if the blue
button had been pressed prior to it. Thus, it may be possible to
argue that children need only focus on the last button-pressing
event, ignoring the previous button-pressing event and the order in
which the two button presses took place. The fact that 5-year-olds
pass the infer-object task when the act of the last doll is empha-
sized might be thought to lend support to this interpretation,
insofar as the task instructions focus children’s attention on this
doll. There are two possible responses to such an argument. One
response may be to argue that grasping that the last act of two acts
is the causally relevant one in itself involves some sort of consid-
eration of the relative order of the acts—the last act is only such
because there were one or more preceding acts. Another response
might be that if passing the task is a matter of simply focusing on
the actions of only one doll, then the 4-year-olds might be expected
to perform well in Study 4, in which the last doll was especially
salient. In fact, the performance of this group was at its lowest
level in this study. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that a possible
fruitful avenue for future research would be to vary the nature of
the causal relationships between events in a sequence. Specifically,
performance on the present task could be contrasted with perfor-
mance on a task in which the outcome of the last event in the
sequence depended causally on what events had preceded it.
We have argued that, taken as a whole, our findings indicate a
developmental progression from reliance on temporal updating to
the ability to make temporal–causal inferences. However, it should
be noted that there are a variety of reasons why the younger
children may fail to make the appropriate temporal–causal infer-
ence. The pretest questions were designed to ensure that all chil-
dren who progressed to the testing stage knew (a) the order in
which the dolls always acted and (b) which toy was yielded by
which button. We are confident that children knew the order in
which the dolls acted, insofar as no child ever failed the relevant
pretest question. Indeed, in Studies 3 and 4 they were questioned
about this again immediately before the test question, and again no
child got this question wrong. We would also argue that the good
performance of the 3-year-olds on the visible version of the infer-
object task suggests robust memory for how the apparatus worked,
even in these very young children. Nevertheless, as a further
check, memory for this information could have been reassessed
posttest.
Putting this aside, if we make the assumption that children’s
difficulty lay not in remembering the two types of relevant infor-
mation but in putting them together, there are at least two alter-
native explanations for our findings. First, it may be that young
1 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this
interpretation.
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children do not understand the significance of the temporal order
information they have been provided with. In other words, the
failure is a conceptual one: As Povinelli et al. (1999) described it,
children of this age do not grasp that the passage of time involves
the unfolding of “a successive series of causally interdependent
states of the world” (p. 1427). Second, it may be that children have
the relevant concept of time, but their difficulties stem from the
working memory demands of the task. The idea here would be that
it is the combined processing demands of retrieving the necessary
pieces of information from long-term memory, holding them in
working memory, and making the appropriate inference that are
beyond younger children. In this interpretation, children’s failure
is not due to a lack of understanding, but of putting that under-
standing to work. Our findings, as they stand, do not allow us to
distinguish clearly between these two possible interpretations. The
fact that 4-year-olds are still not successful in Study 4, when they
are provided with some assistance in the reasoning process, would
seem to point toward a failure of understanding. However, this
issue may be best resolved by examining children’s performance
on a variety of different temporal–causal reasoning tasks that
differ in their working memory demands. We are currently pursu-
ing this line of investigation.
Finally, we turn to considering some of the broader theoretical
implications of our findings. If it is correct that our task and that
of Povinelli et al. (1999) shed light on a conceptual limitation in
young children, this has important implications for descriptions of
children’s developing understanding of time. Historically, research
on the development of children’s thinking about time has tended to
focus on the emergence of more complex temporal abilities
(Fraisse, 1982; Piaget, 1969), perhaps due to a lack of useful
analyses of the components of basic temporal understanding (for
notable exceptions, see Nelson, 1996; Weist, 1989). However,
although Piaget focused on relatively complex temporal abilities,
he also made it clear that an important component of a mature
concept of time is that identified by Povinelli et al. (1999), namely
an appreciation of the systematic causal relationships that obtain
between events that are associated with their temporal order
(Piaget, 1969, especially chap. 1). Furthermore, the idea that a
mature or objective conception of time involves a certain type of
causal understanding is one that has appeared previously in the
philosophical literature (Campbell, 1994; Martin, 2001).
One important set of considerations, in this context, concerns
potential connections between a grasp of the asymmetrical nature
of causal relations and an understanding of the notions of the past
and the present. At its simplest, the idea would be that understand-
ing the notions of the past and the present is, in part, a matter of
understanding that what was the case in the past may have had a
causal impact on what is the case in the present, but that the
converse is not possible. However, an equally crucial ingredient in
our mature notion of time is the idea that certain past events have,
or might have, happened without any causal traces of them re-
maining in the present. (In philosophy, this issue is closely con-
nected to debates about realism concerning the past; see, e.g.,
Peacocke, 2001.) It is this aspect of temporal thought, specifically,
that seems particularly closely connected to the specific type of
temporal–causal reasoning we have described in this article. That
is to say, what makes intelligible the idea that certain past events
might have happened without leaving any causal traces in the
present is precisely the thought that the overall outcome of a
sequence of events depends on the temporal order in which they
happen, such that later events in the sequence may change or
obliterate the effects of events that occurred earlier in the
sequence.
This is not to say that young children who may lack such causal
understanding of event sequences have no way of conceptualizing
the relationships between different events. The fact that children
use tensed forms of verbs, often correctly, early in their linguistic
development (i.e., at an age younger than the children tested in the
present studies) suggests otherwise (Smith, 1980; Weist, 1986,
1989). However, the challenge for cognitive developmental psy-
chologists is to provide sufficiently rich descriptions of early
conceptual abilities that may underpin this and other related abil-
ities, and to describe how these differ from the possession of
mature temporal concepts (McCormack & Hoerl, 1999). The sug-
gestion of the present article is that providing such a description
must at least in part rest on a consideration of how causal reason-
ing abilities develop and change.
In conclusion, the findings of the present studies provide support
for a developmental distinction between the ability to update one’s
model of the world as it changes and more sophisticated temporal–
causal reasoning abilities. The ability to make temporal–causal
inferences is likely to be one of considerable developmental im-
portance, the emergence of which enables children to deal more
effectively with temporally extended reality. In particular, a num-
ber of researchers have argued that temporal–causal understanding
is important in the development of autobiographical or episodic
memory (McCormack & Hoerl, 2001; Perner, 2001; Pillemer,
1998; Povinelli et al., 1999; Reese, 2002; Welch-Ross, 2001).
Further, although we have only considered here children’s ability
to make temporal–causal inferences about events that have already
occurred, this ability may also be vital in planning events in the
future. Indeed, recent research would suggest that preschool chil-
dren have difficulties planning future sequences of events, even if
they can remember and reconstruct similar sequences of events
(Atance & O’Neill, 2001; Benson, 1997; but see Bauer, Schwade,
Wewerka, & Delaney, 1999). Such difficulties may stem from
problems in explicitly reasoning about the causal connections
between events. Given the fundamental nature of such reasoning,
it would seem to be important that future research examines
whether the developmental findings that we have reported here are
generalizable and that it explores the developmental role of
temporal–causal reasoning in a variety of cognitive domains.
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